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ECONOMIC IRRATIONALITY AMONG PASTORAL PEOPLES 




This paper represents an examination by an economist of the so-called 
"theory of pastoral conservatism" .in order to establish some limits as to its 
validity and some ways in which this- validity might be properly tested. To 
most officials, overstocking arises out of the irrational 'cattle complex' of 
the pastoralists, but this view Is challenged by two alternative explanations 
which are presented here: the economic fcommon property' explanation that 
overstocking is likely to arise from the divergence between private and social 
interests so long as cattle are Individually owned and the land is owned 
communally, and the sociological explanation which refers to a number of 
social functions of cattle beyond the-provision of sustenance. As an 
alternative to these two explanations, It Is suggested that an excess cattle 
population may simply be associated with an excess human population. At any 
rate, when assessing the proper stocking level in any area both the stock-to-
land ratio and the stock-to-human litio must be taken into consideration. 
A "lack of commercial-mindedness" among pastoralists is also frequently 
hypothesised, but this notion must be tested with more systematic information 
on marketing facilities , on the actual level of sales and on the stock-to-
human ratio. Evidence is presented that among the Pokot of northern Kenya 
resistance to selling cattle in order to reduce the size of herds is very strong. 
A case study from Tanzania also indicates that when a substantial investment 
programme was carried out in a pastoral area, the number of livestock rose 
enormously„ Some of this increase xn numoers was ecologically supportable, but 
a great deal was note 
Finally the usefulness of the term 'cattle complex' is questioned. The 
focus should be rather on more testable propositions such as the holding of 
excess stock, the level of sales, the willingness to limit large individual 
holdings of cattle, the purchase (given an adequate level of realisable income) 
of cash goods, and the like, which may throw light on behaviour and its 
rationality according to some stated criteria,, 
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Administrators, technical experts and, to a lesser extent, economists 
have criticised the apparent inefficiency and 'irrationality' of pastoralists -
to an even greater -extent than at one time peasant cultivators were criticised 
and alleged to exhibit 'backward-bending supply curves' of effort and output. 
The work of econometricians has been effective in establishing the existence 
of strongly positive supply responses among peasant farmers all over the world"*" 
and largely disposed of this particular debate. However, only social 
anthropologists, by and large, have so far defended the rationality of the 
traditional pastoral system, and here with some lack of unanimity. This 
paper represents an examination by an economist of the so-called "theory of 
pastoral conservatism" in order- to establish some limits as to its validity 
and some ways in which this validity might be properly tested. Official 
criticism of the pastoralists is that (a) their lack of interest in exchanging 
cattle for cash prevents their obtaining the benefits of the cash economy in 
the form of consumer goods, and (b) their 'cattle complex' has led them in 
many areas to accumulate excessive numbers of cattle, endangering their 
environment through overgrazing. In contrast, progress through various 
development schemes must be based on restriction of cattle numbers, reduction 
of overgrazing and improvement of pastures' through controlled rotational 
grazing„ While controlled grazing is the starting point of most schemes, 
motives for retaining cattle and willingness to sell cattle, and thus economic 
motivation in general, are fundamental to the problem of overgrazing and the 
prospects for its control. 
The question raised here is of considerable practical importance since 
the pastoral areas contain substantial populations so far neglected and in 
danger of continuing to be left out of the development process in the 
independent developing countries, just as they were during the colonial period. 
The new emphasis in international circles on regional income distribution and 
on assisting backward regions within less developed countries necessarily 
involves giving attention to pastoral economies; and the increasing number 
of development schemes and proposals, involving considerable investments. 
lo This literature is too voluminous to cite here. 
20 Rigby finds it "singularly unfortunate that an anthropologist who has 
contributed so much to the understanding of indigenous African economies as 
Schneider has should contribute to a cultural model of Nilotic pastoralism' 
which purports to 'explain' 'pastoral conservatism' among the Pokot and other 
eastern African peoples!,' P„ Rigby, 9, referring to 10. 
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being Introduced to such regions in Kenya, for example, raises the question 
of the response to incentives and economic change, and the returns likely to 
obtain. 
In the somewhat jaundiced eye of the official, overstocking arises 
out of the irrational 'cattle complex' of the pastoralist. Cattle are wanted 
for their own sake rather than for the sustenance they provide, and numbers 
are kept In excess of those which the environment can properly support and 
to a degree inconsistent with ordinary economic rationality. This explanation 
is challenged by two alternative views. The first argues that social objectives 
need to be taken into account, and that the numbers of cattle are not 
necessarily excessive If these other, perfectly rational, aims are considered. 
The second, 'economic' explanation is that overstocking actually follows from 
economic motivation: specifically, from the pursuit of private economic 
interests rather than social benefit. 
It will be useful here to concentrate on situations of overstocking 
and overgrazing with which officials have been most concerned and where it 
would appear by definition irrational for a community to choose to expand 
cattle numbers beyond the point where cattle yield (in terms of milk and 
meat) is at a long-run maximum. 
THE 'ECONOMIC' EXPLANATION OF OVERSTOCKING: A PROBLEM OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
A recent report in Kenya (6, Chapter 10) points out that a simple 
economic explanation may by itself be adequate. Overstocking is likely to 
arise out of the divergence between private and social (group) interests in 
the holding of cattle. So long as land is owned communally, it pays an 
individual to maximise his own holding of cattle. He has no interest in 
restricting his own stock in order to preserve grass since, if the rest of 
the community does not follow his example, there will be no significant effect 
on the total numbers of cattle being grazed on the land, and he will personally 
suffer a loss. This is true if all members of the community would gain in the 
longer run from a reduced aggregate herd and improved pasture, and indeed even 
if failure to restrict numbers posed a threat to the continued existence of the 
animal and ultimately the human population. 
Some evidence of the possible validity of interpreting this as a 
'common property' problem is provided by experience in South Baringo in Kenya 
where private holdings were created by enclosure. Von Kaufman has described 
the results as follows:-
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.... There has been remarkable development of 
individual ranching operations. Individual plots 
of 30 to 50 hectares have been planned with good 
access ways left to common facilities such as water, 
dips and markets. When these plots were demarcated, all 
were composed of poor land, some absolutely bare eroded 
earth. Many of these plots have been 
improved or indigenous grasses. Cattle numbers have 
been reduced.... Grass poaching on neighbouring plots, 
and failure to practise regular dipping, have been 
stopped by successful prosecutions. In drought, farmers 
have apparently learned to sell, or at least remove their 
stock in time and restock after the drought. Assistance 
has been limited to some excellent Range Management 
Division re-seeding trials, a few small-scale loans for 
pasture development and the purchase of quality cattle, 
and normal extension services. 
Much closer scrutiny of this particular experiment is needed, and of 
how general the lessons are, but it does at least indicate the possibility 
of improved response when the social/private interest divergence is eliminated. 
Before accepting this relatively straightforward explanation, however, we 
need to examine in detail the 'sociological' explanation and to review the 
various 'social' objectives which have been given as reasons for holding 
cattle, keeping in mind all the time this more direct economic explanation. 
THE 'SOCIOLOGICAL' EXPLANATION: SOCIAL OBJECTIVES -OF- HOLDING CATTLE 
A great many social anthropologists have referred to the uses of 
cattle. Although we shall refer here particularly to the observations of 
Widstrand regarding the Pokot (13), and of Henriksen regarding the Turkana 
(5), both Kenya tribes, similar references could no doubt be obtained for 
other pastoral peoples throughout Africa. Some of the functions referred 
to by sociologists are in fact economic, though it will be convenient to 
list them here, along with more directly social functions, among the uses 
indicated in the sociological literature. 
1. Sociologists do, of course, start off from the most economic 
function of livestock, that of supplying milk and meat. We have already 
indicated here that if grazing is limited, whether under individual 
holding or for the group under communal holding, expanding numbers of 
cattle to the point of overgrazing will increase supply only in the 
short run and could seriously decrease it in the long run. Under 
communal grazing divergence between private and social interests could 
nevertheless make it rational for each individual to expand numbers in 
the absence of a collective agreement to the benefit of all. 
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2. Both Henriksen and Widstrand mention the use of cattle as legal 
tender within a non-monetised economy. This is an inaccurate term, as a 
matter of fact, since legality is not involved: what is intended is the use 
of cattle as money, and specifically to perform the unit-of-account function 
of money. The use of cattle in this way does not in itself, however, require 
"_arge numbers of (poorer quality) beasts. If smaller 'denominations' are 
required, for instance, this is obtainable through payment in the form of steers, 
rather than cows, or younger steers or goats, which are in fact recognised 
as the 'small change' of the system. Schneider has actually gone as far as to 
suggest that reduction in overall livestock numbers would cause the equivalent 
of 'deflation' in the economy. (11) This is a false translation from the 
world of business, where deflation may affect the confidence of businessmen 
and speculators, and thus Investment and employment.• Here reducing livestock 
numbers would increase their value over time relative to other items (e.g. 
brides) and improve their value as investment goods. 
3. Another function of money, and in this case of livestock, is as a 
store of value or beyond that, as just indicated, as an investment. Henriksen, 
following Barth,refers to the fact that through livestock "the pastoralist can 
increase his capital without the presence of any market institutions" and that 
"even today (animals) represent the best Investment object for practically all 
v-.-.r. ., giving the greatest increase on a man's capital". (2, p.24) But if 
serious overgrazing exists, maximising returns on Investment: for the community 
as a group would require restriction of numbers, not their maximisation, and 
it is a weakness for sociologists to list the above, without qualification, as 
valid reasons for accumulating cattle. For the community, long term insurance 
and 'saving' in these circumstances are much better provided by conservation of 
the natural resource (grass), which will primarily determine how many cattle, 
and what yield, will be available in the long term. This would hold for the 
individual on his own holding as well as for the community, but not for the 
Individual with unrestricted access to communal grazing. 
4. Widstrand and others mention risk aversion as a good reason for 
holding large numbers of cattle. There is something in this to the extent 
that risk of theft is Involved, though this is not everywhere a problem. An 
individual with only six high-quality animals in one place is at greater risk 
3- Cattle would of course be a valid investment, even for the community 
as a whole, where the grazing resource was not being fully utilised. 
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than one with, say, sixteen poor quality beasts grazed in different locations. 
It is likely that the holding of substantial numbers of sheep and goats is in 
part a response to risk, goats in particular being hardier and more capable 
of surviving, thus permitting their owners to survive throughout a drought. 
Holding large numbers of cattle is probably not the best form of 
insurance against drought, however: losses from drought will not be reduced 
proportionately by large numbers of weak beasts so much as by having strong 
apimals, which can withstand drought for a longer period, and by a better 
reserve of grass. 
The danger of disease which may strike any animal healthy or weak 
does provide a valid reason for the individual to have more cattle, particularly 
if he is able to disperse his holdings in different locations. Although a 
strong social network will'provide some restitution to an unlucky individual, 
this communal spirit will not be so strong as to provide a hundred per cent 
'cover'. For the pastoral community as a whole the 'law of large numbers' 
will provide a defence against disease without requiring additional livestock, 
except insofar as the community consists of individuals each requiring this 
I • 
'cover'. As in the case of drought however, healthier animals will have some 
additional powers of recovery from disease which reduce the importance Of this 
factor. 
5. Turning to the more 'social' objectives of holding cattle, it has 
been suggested that economic benefits arising out of a wide social network 
may also be obtained, the latter in turn being derived from prestigious 
dattle ownership. Henriksen analyses, these quite carefully in relation ;to 
the Turkana: (a) a stockowner will'from time to time travel with his herd 
to distant areas and will require help of one kind or another along the way; 
(b) the dispersal of his herd will be facilitated, with his wives and/or sons 
in charge of cattle being permitted to stay in others' camps and friends also 
providing surveillance of cattle, bringing benefits in terms of use of pasture 
and insurance against drought or disease; (c) friends and relatives will speak 
out on a person's behalf at meetings where his economic interests may be at 
stake; and"lastly (d'TTEriendship may provide essential social insurance against 
loss, as assistance to others may be repaid later on in times of need. Thus, 
Gulliver reports that rich families in Turkana will try to marry rich families, 
"while poor families will nearly always have to marry poor families". Turkana 
friendship, he says, "is something nearly approaching a business agreement". 
(4, p. 210). In a similar vein, Barth says that "in fact the formal Turkana 
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friendship seems to be a purely transactional relationship in which the parties 
involved continually calculate the prestations (sic) that are involved". 
If the motives are really economic, however, a man's friendship 
should rate more highly the greater the value of his herd (in terms of 
productivity) rather than the number'of animals it contains. The explanation 
for the farmer's concern with numbers rather than productivity and value must 
then be related to the divergence between private and social interest referred 
to earlier. The very fact that what appears to be a part of ordinary social 
relations turns out to be a matter of close economic calculation suggests 
that this will be so. These gains in any case arise out of some individuals 
being better off than others, and do not hold for the community taken as a 
group. 
6. Apart from these indirect benefits, cattle (and the acquisition of 
additional wives which ownership of cattle facilitates) may also provide 
direct utility to the owner as a form of demonstrable wealth and source of 4. 
prestige. - If this motive is irrational, it is- not mere so than the purchase-i -'• of lar^e houses and expensive cars in Western countries. - Here the accumulation 
of wealth, even in non-demonstrable form (through a fat bank balance or paper 
i 
securities), undoubtedly affords many people direct utility; and we should 
in general distinguish satisfaction derived from income and from wealth. In 
a non-monetised livestock society, livestock are the only movable asset which 
can be readily accumulated. Where such accumulation is at the expense of 
income, in this case the value of the community's herd and its yield, there 
might however come a point where it may be considered irrational. Clearly 
value rather than numbers of the herdishould carry most prestige. Most 
important, however, is that from the community's point of view there is no 
utility derivable from this type of prestige, which is obtained by some 
individuals as a result of having more than others; while the disadvantaged 
may well suffer equivalent loss of utility from having less than others. 
7• One of the most publicised reasons for accumulating cattle is for 
.paying brideprice. Henriksen notes, that "It surely remains the biggest 
expenditure of stock that any man has". Gulliver mentions the payment of 
almost 50 cattle and camels plus about 90 small stock in Turkana, and in 
it, " 
I, y* . 
Henriksen states in relation to the Turkana, and this is no doubt 
true generally among pastoralists, that "social prestige is usually 
proportionate to the number of animals a man owns". (5, p. 17) 
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some parts of East Africa this may be exceeded,, (4) It is not at all 
irrational to accumulate livestock for the sake of obtaining wives, which 
are useful both as consumption goods (giving direct utility) and as producer 
goods, providings together with their children, a major source of labour (to 
tend cattle and in Pokot to produce food crops) as well as providing prestige. 
What is not clear is in the first place whether this use requires 
numbers of cattle rather than weight of cattle: rational pastoralists, with 
a good eye for a beast, should be able to assess the value of a wife in terms 
of quality and not merely quantity of animals, though admittedly it is easier 
to strike a bargain when numbers are used and to advertise the price 'fetched* 
by the girl„ Secondly, it is not obvious that net accumulation of stock by 
the tribal group is required on this account, because accumulation for the 
sake of securing brides is balanced by a receipt of stock by the relatives 
of the bride: a "typical' family unit with an equal number of daughters and 
sons diould expect credits and debits to balance out over time.5 Henriksen, 
while still including bridewealth as a reason for the community to accumulate 
stock, acknowledges this implicitly when he says that;-
As a man grows wealthy in animals , he will marry many wives 
and thereby reduce his animals, not only through the payment 
of bridewealth, but also his herd will be dispersed when his 
sons marry and he himself dies0 It is, therefore, difficult 
for a family to remain wealthy over several generations. (5, 
p= 28) 
In any case, among the Turkana, and this is generally the case, 
"the size of the bridewealth varies with the wealth of the groom or the 
groom's father" (5, p. 23), so that the level of the brideprice may not 
be the cause of the accumulation of stock so much as the effect of it. 
Certainly it appears that average brideprices may vary with the overall 
supply situation for stock: in more plentiful times in Pokot, for instance, 
prices were higher, as high as 60 beasts compared to a 19 71 estimate of 
12 to 25 cattle and 25 to 40 goats„ Work carried out by Schneider also 
supports this view0 (11) We may note an additional utilitarian element 
in the Pokot system of bridewealth (also existing elsewhere): in addition 
to payment to the bride's parents, the bridegroom must supply the bride 
50 It has been pointed out to me that in some cases a number of 
relatives may contribute to bridewealth on behalf of the prospective groom, 
and a certain number of cattle is thus required to permit each to contribute. 
This appears to be a valid point, based on cattle as an (indivisible) medium 
of exchange: it would not hold if contributions in the form of money were 
acceptableo However it also strengthens the second point that bridewealth 
is only a transfer within the community and that for an individual contributions 
and receipts will balance out over a period of time. 
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with her 'allotted herdE , which will, together with the grain she grows, 
guarantee for herself and her children a minimum subsistence. Such 
s _3~ of the new household should, however, depend more on the yield 
of the cows (especially where slaughter is infrequent) rather than numbers. 
80 The other major 'indirect* use of cattle among the Pokot, besides 
bridewealth (kandin) is, according to Widstrand, the tilia_system, whereby 
a cow is exchanged for a steer when the latter is required for slaughter. 
The receiver of the cow returns the calves produced to the other person, 
but still incurs a social obligation to the latter, who may subsequently 
ask him for certain favours„ One person may, by providing as many as 10 
to 15 cows to others in this way, achieve considerable prestige * The 
recipient is simply acquiring a supply of milk, which contributes to 
subsistence, since he does not keep the calves. It is a useful system, 
since it reduces inequality and provides social security against risk 
by providing those who have lost cows through drought, disease or theft 
the opportunity to obtain a cow, not for rebuilding their herds, but for 
basic sustenance„ Since the donor obtains more prestige the more surplus 
cows he can dispose of in this way (the more steers he can afford to keep 
or slaughter), there is some incentive for the individual to acquire more 
cows in order to spread his favours. This practice is, however, a function 
of inequality (with complete equality of animal wealth the system would 
disappear) and of the risk of losses: it does not therefore provide a case 
for the community as a whole to aim at large numbers of cattle. 
9. Widstrand refers to the use of cattle for ritual purposes or for 
communal sharing, i.e. feasts. Yet if a beast is slaughtered and shared 
out among many, there will be no great advantage in using a smaller or 
less valuable beast: what is important is the supply of meat. Moreover, 
communal sharing may be primarily a form of (communal) consumption with 
the number of feasts being arranged depending on the availability of 
beasts, rather than vice versa. Any form of consumption wi»ll, in any case, 
keep numbers down rather than increase them. Though Henriksen gives a 
number of good reasons for individuals to expand their herds, it is worth 
6 noting that he also includes this rather trivial one. 
6„ He goes to the trouble of mentioning that "the slaughtering of an 
ox is necessary for the couple to be properly married." (5, p. 24) 
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We should stress that we have found none of the above motives for 
holding livestock irrational. We are not in a position to say the custom 
of paying brideprice is irrational (though women's liberationists would ,say 
it is not a good one), any more than we can say a Western capitalist's desire 
to accumulate wealth is irrational (though this might well be considered a 
misguided activity). Our concern is whether these motives provide a valid 
reason for individuals or for the community to expand cattle numbers; and 
particularly to expand cattle numbers in a situation where the land's carrying 
capacity is already utilised so that aggregate yield or output cannot be 
increased. 
Table 1 summarises the findings under each of the motives mentioned. 
It is significant that none of the functions require expanded numbers of 
cattle except to the extent of the legitimate needs of individuals in the 
community for reserve against losses from disease and theft. This means 
particularly if an 'informal' social security system provides this latter 
safeguard that it would pay the community to control cattle numbers through 
collective agreement. Two of the most important motives, the supply of milk" 
and meat and the use of cattle as an investment, hold under communal tenure 
but not individual tenure, indicating the property rights problem. The i ~ > 3. 
remaining functions, largely social, provide some rationale for expanding 
numbers, but almost certainly not to anything like the extent frequently 
observed. The "sociologist's explanation" of expanded numbers is thus an 7 incomplete one and further explanation must be sought elsewhere. 
A THIRD EXPLANATION: THE LIVESTOCK-TO-HUMAN RATIO 
An alternative explanation of both- overstocking-and the reluctance 
to sell is simply poverty, a lack of available surplus. Excess cattle 
population may in'fact be associated with excess human population. Technical 
7. Although we refer to the above as the "sociologist's explanation", the 
other explanation based on property rights has not gone unnoticed by sociolo-
gists . Thus Henriksen says that:-
This latter factor (the number of animals that the Turkana pastures 
can sustain) will not prevent the individual Turkana from increasing 
his herds as long as a major catastrophe does not occur in the 
district. This is so because the stock-owning unit has no way of 
exercising pasture management since the pastures are held in common 
by the whole tribe. 
He does, however, include this among diverse other reasons for maintaining 
cattle numbers, and does not consider how far these other motives depend upon 
this as a fundamental cause. 
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Table 1, Motives for holding cattle andapriori effect on numbers held 
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experts and officials talk about excess stock always in relation to the 
carrying-capacity of the a that is the stock: land ratio. However, 
attention should also be paid, where livestock is the basic means of 
human sustenance, to the stock: human ratio« While decreases in the latter 
ratio may be good for the land, it may mean a deterioration, at least in 
the short term,in the standard of living of the community„ Exhortations 
to restrict cattle numbers for the sake of long term benefit may thus be 
soundly based, but difficult to follow given the high rate of time preference 
likely to prevail at extreme levels of poverty. Where this holds, reduction in 
cattle numbers might be easier to achieve if there were simultaneously a 
reduction in numbers of human population, through out-migration. But this 
outlet does not offer itself to a significant degree for the socially-cohesive 
pastoralists„ 
'Overpopulation', where it exists, appears to have occurred not 
through an increase in population numbers, but through a decrease in the 
amount and quality of the land made available to them. Rigby points out 
that "owing to the low population densities and high mobility of family and 
homestead groups in the pastoral areas .„„ the early settlers and administrators 
were able to "rationalize' their claims to the most desirable areas occupied by 
pastoralists, particularly in Maasai, Nandi, and Kipsigis country, but in others 
as well." (9,p„ 13) Widstrand makes similar charges to the effect that 
deprivation of traditional land rights and geographical restriction of the 
Pokot, continued since independence, is in part responsible for apparent 
overstocking„ To the extent that this is true, officials' arguments for 
control of livestock numbers are not very likely to meet with much favour. 
If the population/stock ratio is the problem, rather than livestock 
numbers per se, it should be possible to verify this by direct examination 
of this ratioo Unfortunately, data on this point, least of all accurate data, 
are hard to come by, although some data for East Africa are reviewed by Rigby. 
He quotes Allan (1, p. 311) to the effect that for instance "in the case of 
the Sqmali and Turkana the ratio of livestock to humans may approximate to the 
minimum," According to Jacobs even the Maasai with about 13 head of cattle 
per person (in 1961), plus small stock, might not always obtain an adequate 
diet: "While two or three milch cows can keep an adult adequately supplied 
in the wet season, 10-15 may be required in the dry season, and 20 or more in 
periods of drought." (7) By chance some relatively rare data exist for the 
8. Substantial areas with very low density of human population may appear to 
be underpopulated,, whereas in reality human numbers are excessive in relation 
to carrying capacity. 
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Kongelai group ranch area of West Pokot where a comparatively accurate 
population/livestock census was undertaken in 1971. This is an area 
where the government is anxious to secure substantial destocking as a 
basis for the introduction of sounder livestock management practices, so 
we can appropriately test for the significance of this factor in this 
particular location. 
The census revealed 412 potential scheme participants, including 
334 resident family units or stock owners, amounting to a human population 
of some 2,000 people. There were 78 non-resident owners. The livestock 
9 
owned amounted to 5j200 Kenya stock units of cattle and 1,600 stock units 
of sheep and goats (assuming 10 'shoats' equal one K su). With an estimated 
land carrying capacity of one stock unit to over 10 acres, the total of 
6,800 stock units was estimated officially to exceed the carrying capacity 
of 5,000 by some 1,800 to 2,000 stock units in 1971, and this provides the 
destocking target. 
Assuming the residents own a proportionate amount of the livestock 
counted (7,373 cattle and 15,964 sheep and goats), they would have 5,978 
cattle and 12,941 sheep and goats, The resident families average six 
persons, of whom three may be taken as adults and three as children. 
Counting the latter as halves, this gives a family of four-and-a-half 
adult-equivalents and a resident population of 1,500 adult-equivalents. 
This suggests ownership of about four cattle (not cows) and eight sheep 
and goats (mainly goats) per adult, with each family having four-and-a-
half times this amount. In the harsh conditions of West Pokot, the 
consumption yield obtaining from this would be quite low and resistance 
to a reduction in stock numbers .not at all surprising. The livestock/ 
human ratio must tfierefoirebe considered crucial. And it is significant 
that here in West Pokot, where the success of government policy depends 
on destocking and where a major data collection effort was carried out 
by the offieiails concerned, the importance of this ratio was not realised 
and the ratio itself not calculated. The situation in the Kongelai group 
ranch area can be considered as not atypical for the district as a whole. 
It is equally important that denials by some social anthropologists 
that excess stock or overgrazing is a problem at all should be examined 
in terms of these two crucial ratios. It remains true that in one important 
9. One Kenya stock unit comprises the equivalent of 600 lbs. of live 
weight bovine. 
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sense excess stock is defined in relation to the carrying capacity of the 
: land in a purely technical way, and it is evidenced in this sense by physical 
deterioration of the grass cover over time. Excess stock in relation to 
people's own subsistence requirements is a separate issue. 
LACK OF COMMERCIALISATION AS IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOUR 
Related to the charge of irrationality associated with excessive 
accumulation of livestock numbers and overstocking is the criticism of the 
lack of "commercial-mindedness" of the pastoralists, resulting in an 
unwillingness to sell their cattle. This charge has a long history among 
officials and technical experts particularly. Among sociologists this has 
perhaps received rather less attention, although it should be stated that 
the variety of functions performed by livestock is not sufficient to explain 
why cattle are not used for the function of securing, via the market, other 
wants such as clothing or household goods, including many items which could 
undoubtedly soften some of the hardiness of pastoral life. Obviously absence 
of household items must simply reflect poverty to a substantial degree. But 
whether poverty is sufficient to explain the near-total lack of trade-off 
between stock and other goods is difficult to say. 
Rigby denies that a reluctance to sell exists, quoting data 
collected by Jacobs (7) for Tanganyika Maasailand for the years 1936 to 
1959, reproduced here as Table 2. "So much," says Rigby "for the myth of 
pastoralist 'conservatism' in the matter of livestock sales, a myth created 
during the latter part of the colonial period, particularly in Kenya." 
(9, p. 40) 

























Source; Jacobs, 7, p. 40. 
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Jacobs had come to the same conclusion, stating that:-
One of the many myths commonly attributed to the Maasai 
is a reluctance to sell their cattle,, Not only is this 
untrue, but disguises the fact that, until recently, Maasai 
have been restricted from selling on the open market and, 
like keen businessmen everywhere, the only reason which has 
prevented them from selling more cattle than indeed they do 
has been the lack of what they consider fair prices. Maasai 
have been selling cattle to individual African buyers (admit-
tedly illegally) for over fifty years now and have a shrewd 
knowledge of what the market will bear. 
Table 2 provides stronger evidence of an upward trend over time in Maasai 
sales rather than a specific "elasticity of supply' with respect to price; 
but clearly caution must be exercised in asserting reluctance to sell. 
However, Rigby's evidence is far from conclusive for Maasailand, let alone 
other areas. Referring to the 1949-59 Kenya scheme south-east of Nairobi, 
he says that, after the improvement in pasture resulting from the introduction 
of rotational grazing, the Kenya scheme eventually collapsed:-
Insufficient attention had been given to the disposal of 
excess stock from rapidly increasing herds, marketing 
facilities had not been provided, and a very'high capital 
investment had made the scheme totally unrealistic to 
begin with, A further complicating factor was that the 
elders had selected the settlers from amongst the relatively 
poorer families of Kaputiei section, and this provided them 
with an excellent chance to become as wealthy as possible as 
quickly as possible, with little incentives to sell excess 
stock, (9,p.37) 
This episode suggests most obviously the advantages of controlled 
grazing and eliminating the effects described of the pursuit of individual 
over collective benefit. It also shows the failure to profit from the 
resultant build-up of stock by controlled selling; for while marketing 
facilities might have been better, it is not possible to say that these 
were absent in Kenya so close to major consuming areas. And in 1960-61 
in Tanganyika a meat-packing plant at Arusha had to be closed down because 
supplies of cattle for slaughter were not forthcoming in sufficient 
quantity from the Maasailand area. 
Thus the hypothesis of "lack of commercial-mindedness" still needs 
further testing, with more systematic information on sales in relation to 
marketing facilities. Since lack of sales could simply reflect poverty and 
a lack of surplus, the livestock/human ratio would need to be calculated 
for different areas. While in the West Pokot case this is clearly a 
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fundamental factor, the same does not seem to hold in all areas of East 
Africa with equal force. 
Moreover, it is necessary to take account of inequality of stock 
holdings, which can be very great. Even in the relatively poor area of 
Kongelai described, holdings are said to vary from 10 cattle or less per 
household unit to 100 or more. In other areas, such as Central/Southern 
Tanzania, individual holdings are said to reach more than 1,000. Thus 
even if average holdings are quite low, we should still expect commercial 
sales from the wealthier stock owners. The test for rationality which needs 
to be made is of the sales of cattle by the relatively wealthy^ pastoralists. 
Direct investigation of the purchase of consumer goods, particularly 
by the latter, would be useful. Here it must be realised that the consumption 
of many (but not all) consumer goods is incompatible with a pastoral life, and 
these need first of all to be excluded. It is also necessary to take account 
of the problem of jealousy in a close and cohesive society, and the fact, as 
Duesenberry has pointed outv 3),that even in Western societies wants are in part 
collectively or socially determined and related to an accepted way of life. 
A CASE STUDY; SOME EVIDENCE OF MOTIVATION AMONG THE POKOT 
The foregoing analysis has been made almost entirely on the basis of 
a priori reasoning in respect of the factors involved. Some direct evidence 
regarding motivation among the Pokot was collected by the writer, however, 
through the medium of a lengthy baraza (open-air meeting) at Kongelai, well 
attended by about 100 male Pokot involved in a proposed group ranching 
development which was to be based, as usual, on the introduction of rotational 
grazing. The aim was to probe the apparent barrier of 'pastoral conservatism' 
m order to detect any sign of change in the degree of commercial-mindedness, 
and specifically to explore whether under any circumstances de-stocking might 
be acceptable. 
Participants in the'baraza made strongly emphasised statements, 
certainly consistent with the notion of a 'cattle complex', to the effect 
that, for example, "they were here to accumulate wealth" (equating wealth 
with animals owned) and "animals are life". Suggestions that a smaller 
number of good animals might be more useful than a larger number of poor 
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beasts were strenuously rejected. 
On the side of commercial-mindedness, it was stated that "they had 
no need for money, unless their children were starving". Cattle were sold 
only because of 'calamity', i.e. drought, when there was a fear that they 
might die in any case. They agreed that many cows sold were old ones, those 
due for culling. These statements tended to confirm a recent statement made 
by government officials that "at present animals that come from auction sales 
are nearly always the old and sickly type". (District Animal Husbandry Officers' 
Conference, Nakuru, September 1974) 
Some further questions were designed in part to test whether the 
main problem was that of the divergence between private and social interests , 
and whether establishing an organisation to secure the latter would be 
difficult- Some progress certainly had been made in implementing a limited 
degree of rotational grazing, and a grazing committee existed, with powers 
of fine, to implement grazing rules. However, it was strongly asserted that 
their only problems were disease and lack of rain: the poor condition of 
the animals was due to tsetse, not lack of grass. Similarly, when asked to 
state the benefits which they expected to receive from the operation of the 
ranch, none mentioned improved organisation of grazing and collective control 
of excess stock (the main benefit in the eyes of government): in their eyes 
the benefits were seen as finance for water development and dipping facilities 
which the government was to provide. 
In relation to the possible divergence between private and social 
interests, the considerable inequality in ownership of cattle suggests that 
the best method of effecting a reduction in stock numbers would be to impose 
a ceiling on numbers to be owned by individual family units. This would 
permit a given reduction to be effected with minimum hardship; and it might 
be possible to enlist the support of the poorer members of the group in 
putting pressure on members who were, after all, using up a disproportionate 
share of the communal grass. Officials did not appear so far to have mentioned 
openly any approach to de-stocking, and evident hostility towards the very-
idea made it impossible on this occasion to even ask the question as to how 
the members themselves would wish to have any necessary de-stocking carried 
10. I asked if they would not prefer two or three beautiful wives to a 
larger number of unattractive ones. The response was: "Yes, but this applies 
only to wives, not animals." 
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out. There was no interest, however, in the imposition of ceilings on 
holdings, and no apparent jealousy over numbers owned. Any such inequality 
was considered "God's will","'""'" The suggestion that since the grass belonged 
to all it might not be equitable for some members to use up a disproportionate 
share was rejected: members of the group made the analogy between sending one's 
children to school and sending one's cattle to graze, the implication being 
that each cattle owner should be entitled to use the common land for whatever 
cattle he possessed. The main practical significance of inequality was 
therefore only that the poorer members would resist de-stocking much more 
vehemently. 
Finally, given the vast numbers of small stock also maintained, the 
possibility of de-stocking via a reduction in the number of goats was explored: 
if a genuine 'cattle complex' existed there might be less opposition to this. 
An attempt was made, therefore, to elucidate 'preference functions' as between 
cattle and goats by asking members whether they would prefer a reduction of, 
say, ten goats or one cow. No answers were forthcoming to this question and 
the hostility engendered by it. causing the meeting to be terminated soon 
afterwards, provides further evidence of the obstacles to de-stocking. We 
may conclude that there is in Pokot at the present time a fairly solid wall 
of opposition to de-stocking. 
Information derived from a three-hour baraza, even if attended by 
about 100 members, can hardly be described as systematic. That the 
information was not inaccurate, however, was suggested by the enthusiasm 
with which the most 'conservative' remarks were applauded, by the obviously 
democratic way in which the meeting was conducted, and by the fact that 
committee members, clearly aware of their constituents' feelings, were 
equally 'conservative' in their opinions. Thus direct questioning does not 
immediately produce reference to the varied functions that livestock fulfill 
beyond that of wealth, and does not reveal a willingness to restrict numbers 
on a collective basis, or to restrict large individual holdings, as would be 
indicated by an explanation in terms of divergence between private and 
social interests. Nor is any willingness revealed to sacrifice numbers for 
the sake of benefits anticipated from rotational grazing, even where economic 
..efficiency points to the need for pasture management of this type. A basic 
determinant of attitudes in the Pokot case may well be general poverty and 
11. This is to some extent true according to,.for example, Henriksen and 
Gulliver who point out that large holdings may be constantly broken up by the 
effects of drought and disease. Considerable inequalities do, however, tend 
to persist. 
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the high rate of time preference associated with it. It would appear, 
however, that all these factors operate simultaneously (the 'sociological' 
one to a partial extent) but that even after allowing for these some 
element of 'conservatism' may remain, perhaps taking the form not so much 
of a preoccupation with animals as short-sightedness regarding the effects 
of current economic activity on future yields. But this needs more systematic 
testing in a variety of situations than has been attempted so far. 
INVESTMENT IN PASTORAL ECONOMIES:_ AN EXAMPLE 
How the workings of the pastoral economy and the responses of pastoral 
peoples are viewed by officials and outsiders is of extreme importance to the 
development policy likely to be adopted for pastoral areas. The practical 
relevance of the foregoing analysis may be seen from a brief examination of one 
case study in Tanzanian Maasailand, 
A crucial question is what investments should be made, if any, in 
an attempt to develop the pastoral areas and to improve welfare in these 
areas. In principle, investment in water supplies, if these are well 
12 
distributed to increase the supply of grazing, may yield important 
benefits, However it is widely argued (6) that such investments, unless 
preceded by a willingness to de-stock, to sell cattle commercially and 
to introduce improved resource management with rotational grazing, will 
merely permit pastoralists to keep more cattle alive, expand numbers and 
hasten the destruction of the grass cover, reducing the long-run viability 
of the economy, 
The USAID-financed Maasai Range Project In Tanzania, launched in 
1970, did make substantial investments in Maasailand, including a 
substantial number of new dams, boreholes, dips, markets and Livestock 
Development (veterinary) Centres, Organisation was through ranching 
associations, of which eight had been formed by the end of 1971. ( . 
The local demand for veterinary services and the returns therefrom can 
be seen from the fact that at one association, Talamai, 
calf mortality is said to-_have.^fallen oYer four years frdm 
80 to 90 per cent to under 10 per cent, and the overall cattle 
12. Pasture which is out of reach of water supplies cannot be used: 
judicious Investment in boreholes or earth dams can make it available. 
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death rate from 60 per cent to 10 per cent. This, together no doubt with 
the additional water provided, permitted livestock numbers at Talamai 
Ranching Association to increase from 15,000 stock units at registration 
in 1969 to 41,000 in 1973. Similarly at Komolonik Ranching Association 
the number of stock units increased from 19,000 in 1966 to 30,500 in 1973. 
What is interesting is that on this basis the scheme has generally 
been rated a failure. Thus one researcher, Ole Parkipuny, himself a Maasai, 
concludes that "the 'run-away' increase in livestock population has 
neutralised the investment and wound the clock back. The people are back 
to desperation on how to keep the stock." ( 8) The implicit criticism is, 
first, that the cattle have been accumulated rather than sold, and second, 
that the numbers may have been expanded beyond the carrying capacity of the 
land. To properly assess the situation we need to know the carrying capacity 
of the land (feasible livestock-to-land ratio) and the livestock-to-population 
ratio. According to information supplied by Parkipuny, Talamai Ranching 
Association comprised 400 families who at the start of the period would have 
an average of less than 40 stock units each, or about 8 stock units per adult-
equivalent: still quite low in relation to subsistence needs, This implies that 
accumulation rather than increased sale of cattle was only to be expected and 
that the investments could have produced substantial benefits in terms of 
improved standards of living, even if not in terms of increased cash incomes 
or tax revenue. Elsewhere Parkipuny gives a figure of approximately 25,000 
stock units for carrying capacity. If this is accurate, we should conclude 
that while some 40 per cent of the increase in cattle numbers could be 
justified in terms of both subsistence food requirements and capacity of the 
13 
land, the rest of the increase was in excess of the latter and represents 
'short-sightedness' on the part of the group and a failure to organise control 
of numbers associated largely, no doubt, with the common property problem 
described above. This example indicates, first, the possibility of significant 
returns to investment in pastoral areas, even where commercial sales are not 
obtained, and second, the possibility of useful investigation of the situation 
±n terms of the analytical "tools' discussed earlier, 
THE CONCEPT OF A * CATTLE COMPLEX' AND ITS USEFULNESS 
Before concluding, we may offer some observations regarding the 
usefulness or otherwise of the term 'cattle complex'. While Widstrand 
denies that this complex exists, Henriksen states that:-
13. Carrying capacity is, of course, also a function of the level 
of resource management, and is not fixed absolutel
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Animals are the main form of wealth, and animals enter 
into nearly all social relations and ritual events. There 
can be no doubt that the Turkana have a 'cattle complex' 
in the sense that their herds have a special social and 
ritual value. Today, many of their social relations are 
still registered and expressed through the medium of animals. 
(5, p. 13) 
Clearly much depends on the precise meaning attached to the term 
'cattle complex'. For it would appear inevitable in a society and economy 
based almost entirely on livestock that cattle in particular would tend to 
acquire a special significance, for example in legend and story telling, and 
that discussion would frequently revolve around them. Where financial 
institutions are absent, together with other means of storing wealth, stock 
must also serve as assets and, in a non-monetised economy, as the most 
convenient medium of exchange. 
In a subsistence livestock-based economy, in fact, it seems difficult 
to draw significant conclusions from the fact that livestock perform a wider 
range of economic or social functions thar. elsewhere, or that they are more 
dominant in people's conversation, all of which seems inevitable. The term 
'cattle complex' does not therefore appear at all useful, and is more likely 
to confuse the issue. The focus should be rather on more testable propositions 
such as the holding of excess stock, the level of sales, the willingness to 
limit large individual holdings of cattle, the purchase (given an adequate 
level of realisable income) of cash goods, and the like, which may throw light 
on behaviour and its rationality according to some stated criteria. 
A particularly telling point made by Widstrand in arguing against 
the existence of a 'cattle complex' as an irrational element in Pokot 
society at least, is that the Pokot are actually a 'stock' people and not 
a cattle people, owning according to a 1971 census more than twice as many 
sheep and goats as cattle. As just mentioned, however, goats did not appear 
less sacrosanct to the Pokot as far as de-stocking is concerned. 
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